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I
Despite their diverse originst - and despite the
deliberate inclusion of one outspokenly sceptical view
of aid - these eleven papers imply clear conclusions
about aid-effectiveness. 1. Most aid raises growth
and/or reduces poverty (Section II). 2. A disturbingly
large, possibly rising, proportion does neither.
3. Partly, this is because much aid serves mostly donor
interests. 4. Partly, it is because of inappropriate
recipient policies (Section III). 5. Donors' interests
impede their, and recipients', efforts to improve
recipients' policies. 6. Each donor to, and each
ministry in, a recipient country is imprisoned in a
dilemma. By pursuing self-interested policies, it often
harms aid-effectiveness in that country (for a//donors
and ministries). By avoiding them, it may lose out to
less scrupulous donors and ministries. 'Coordination'
is not a magic solution (Section IV). 7. Macroeconomic
conditions - unlike sector dialogues - seldom work,
but may be implicit in a shift from project to
programme aid. 8. That shift, and the associated aid
shift to Africa, require better institutional and
manpower aid, to maintain adequate effectiveness of
other aid (Section V). 9. Many factors - the
limitations of conditionality; the record of anti-
poverty aid; the record of inefficiency, inequality, and
arguably near-scandal, in aid allocation among
recipients - suggest that major country reallocations
are the key to increased aid-effectiveness (Section VI).
Two papers in this Bul/enn (plus some of this Introduction) derive
from lectures to a series, on 'Financial Flows to Developing
Countries', which I directed at All Souls College, Oxford, in 1984.
Eight papers derive from work for the study of aid-effectiveness,
commissioned by the Task Force on Concessional Flows (repre-
sentatives of 18 governments, chosen by the Finance Ministers of all
Bank-Fund member countries), and directed by Robert Cassen. His
summary paper [Cassen 1986, 1986a; see also Burki and Ayres
1986]. and another outstanding review too recent for discussion
here, [Krueger 1986] should be read in conjunction with this
Bulletin. However, my Introduction in no way summarises Cassen's
work, and in some ways differs from it, so that I am more than
usually grateful for his helpful comments.
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II
There are massive data problems in establishing
whether, where, or when aid raises growth or reduces
poverty. The official definition of 'aid' includes some
flows that are disguised military support ('officially'
not supposed to be aid), and some flows to quite rich
countries - but excludes many 'official' flows at
below-market rates that are only partly concessional.
In assessing effectiveness it is not clear whether gross,
net, or grant-equivalent 'aid' should be measured.
GNP growth and (especially) poverty data are
notoriously weak, especially in the (apparently)
poorest or slowest-growing countries. A large cross-
country sample [Mosley 1986] thus risks major biases
in assessing aid-effectiveness; but a small sample, eg of
'high aid receivers' [Griffin2] risks different biases, of
selectivity. Even the scale of aid depends on the
measure: small and falling, compared to donor GNP
and recipient population [Griffin] and to the require-
ments of poverty reduction [Chaudhuri]; large and
rising, compared to investment or imports or public
expenditure, in African low-income countries, and in
Bangladesh [Hewitt and Kydd, Duncan, Van Arkadie].
There are familiar traps. Except in the very long run,
the ratio of aid to GNP - or to growth - is
'automatically' boosted by a big aid rise, or by a period
of sluggish or negative GNP growth; that makes
countries with more aid look like slow growers, and
makes slow growers look heavily aided [Griffin]. Or
aid may deliberately be allocated to slow growers
[Mosley], taking time to perk them up, if it does. Both
factors can misleadingly suggest perverse aid-growth
relationships.
Nevertheless - while the once convincing national-
/eve! evidence linking aid to growth [Papenek 1972]
now looks dubious [Mosley 1986] - there is strong
evidence from project evaluations that most aid [World
Bank 1985] and most technical cooperation [Muscat]
is successful and high-yielding, and theory gives some
2 Undated references are to papers in this Bulletin.
support to this. Project evaluations for several
agencies are critical, frank, and genuinely independent
- though unfortunately seldom published, and,
except for the Bank, omitting many projects and little
used for feedback [Muscat]. While usually favourable
on rates of return in major sectors and regions
[Mosley], such evaluations cast doubt on the capacity
of aid to reach the very poorest, and the limitations of
'integrated rural development' are redirecting donor
attention towards public works and even food subsidy
[Chaudhuri]. Perhaps it is not sensible to expect aid to
alleviate poverty if governments are reluctant, but it is
even less sensible to expect aid withdrawal to remove
the reluctance [Van Arkadie].
As for theory, the much-maligned 'Harrod-Domar'
approach can help us to analyse what aid does. The
approach, really a tautology, asserts that a country's
growth-rate is the product of (a) the proportion of its
GNP that it can use for purposes other than
consumption and defence, i.e. for 'savings' in the
broadest sense, including education, health, etc., and
(b) the efficiency of such 'savings' in causing growth.
The proportion (a) comprises domestic and foreign
'savings'. More aid is one way to raise foreign 'savings'
- for a very poor country, attracting little cash from
foreign banks or businesses, almost the only way. Such
aid must increase growth, unless it crowds out
substantial amounts of the other part of (a) -
domestic 'saving' - and/or greatly reduces (b), the
efficiency with which total 'saving' is turned into extra
output.
On (a), Kenya experienced some 'crowding out' of
private savings-and-investment by aid - and
probably some switching, as aid-backed investments
made the government sector feel freer to consume
instead [Mosley]. Malawi probably suffered none of
the latter effect, due to its 'fiscal conservatism' [Hewitt
and Kydd]. One estimate is that one dollar more aid to
a typical poor country 'crowds out' 48 cents of
domestic saving [Griffin] - though most other
estimates are lower [Weisskopf 1972; Mosley 19801,
and recent work [Lavy 1985] shows that only
consumption-specific aid (eg food aid), not investment
aid, adds significantly less than its own value to the
recipient country's investment. As for (b), the partly
non-developmental motives of the US Economic
Support Fund [Griffin], the UK Aid and Trade
Provision, and mixed credits generally [Ryrie]
inevitably cut the returns to some aid, and hence the
efficiency with which total 'savings' produce output;
conversely much aid - strikingly that to India's
agricultural research and development [Toye] and to
primary health care - raises such efficiency, by
piloting successful investments and institutions.
Suppose aid comprises one quarter of a country's total
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'savings' of $500 mn (20 per cent of GNP), and -
implausibly - that each extra aid dollar cuts domestic
savings by as much as 48 cents. Aid then doubles;
could this fail to raise the growth rate? The extra
$125 mn of aid crowds out $60 mn of domestic
'saving', so total 'saving' rises from 20 per cent to
22.6 per cent of GNP. Typically, four units of 'saving'
produce about one unit of 'growth'. For the extra aid
to generate no, or negative, extra growth, this
efficiency ratio would have to deteriorate from 4 to
4.525 or worse. There is no evidence that aid has so
large (or any) negative net effect on total capital
efficiency; yet if, as most of the evidence suggests, aid
'crowds out' much less than 48 per cent of its value in
domestic savings, the net efficiency damage has to be
even worse, if it is to prevent aid from accelerating
growth.
III
Nevertheless, the trend of rates of return on aid
projects, as estimated at project completion in each of
the World Bank's last four Annual Reviews of Project
Performance Audits, is deteriorating. This is echoed in
the trend of Kenyan evaluations at project completion,
despite the shortage of 'impact studies' to follow up
returns a few years afterwards [Duncan]. In
Bangladesh, projects satisfactory on completion often
proved non-sustainable, requiring costly 'rehabili-
tation' afterwards [Van Arkadie]. A World Bank
'sustainability study' in 1985 (project details are
confidential) reported that - of a small non-random
selection (27) of their many agricultural projects that
had yielded satisfactory returns at post-completion
audits during 1975-81 - only nine were performing
adequately when revisited for 'impact studies',
typically three to five years later. In sub-Saharan
Africa, it was only one out of 13 projects!
There are three types of reason for this. First, sheer bad
Iuckshould not be underestimated. In the 1980s (when
most 'impact studies' were done), drought, debt or
commodity slump have wrought havoc, not just with
African aid, but among most Third World investments,
private (eg in Brazil) and public, foreign- and
domestic-financed alike. In Africa especially, recession
savagely reduced the capacity of governments to
provide current cash to meet their obligations in
support of aid projects - and this reduced the
projects' return. Second, recipient policy error is the
usual focus of concern; in particular, farmers' prices
(and the domestic value of their foreign sales) can be
depressed by policy, thus reducing their incentives to
raise output by working with aid-financed projects
[Hewitt and Kydd, Duncan, Ryrie]. Probably a much
more serious 'incentive reducer' has been public-
sector neglect of farm investment, delivery and
research. Third, donor policy error, too, can reduce
returns to aid. Political and commercial interests in
aid, if overt, are perfectly legitimate, and tied aid
thanks to a commercial lobby, is normally better than
no aid [Ryrie; for exceptions, see Harvey 1983, and
White 1974]. But the recession of the 1980s has
probably increased pressure on donor governments to
tie aid, and to use it to help troubled domestic
contractors. This inevitably reduces the efficiency of
recipients' capital stock [Griffin] and therefore
aid-effectiveness.
Iv
The strongest message of these papers, however, is
about donor-recipient interactions. The simpler form
of that message is that, where aid is a large part of
public expenditure, especially in Bangladesh and
much of Africa [Van Arkadie, Chaudhuri, Duncan],
recipients' errors and donors' errors reinforce one
another, each rendering the other harder to correct.
Thus donors' complex and distinct aid procedures and
requirements, which 'often reflect inertia or con-
venience rather than economic interest or doctrine',
divert the recipient's scarce administrative skills and
policy analyses - from development management
to aid management [Van Arkadie]; the donors'
'disbursement imperative' pushes recipients towards
over-rapid replication of pilot projects [Toye]; and
both tendencies, plus project proliferation [Duncan,
Ryrie, Van Arkadie], divert or reduce central policy-
making capacity and thus help to cause the domestic
policy omissions, so harmful to aid-effectiveness, of
which donors later complain. Conversely, recipient
ministries, by competing for tied aid projects with
hidden costs [Van Arkadie], encourage donors to act
in ways later judged aid-ineffective by recipient
governments.
If that were all, then 'coordination' - of recipient
ministries, of donor procedures, and of donors with
the recipient Planning or Finance Ministry - would
be an obvious solution. It is costly, and it provokes the
question: who shall coordinate the coordinators? Yet
it is a solution with which many of these papers
concur, whilst cautioning (hopefully?) that donors
should coordinate to avoid presenting Kenyans with
18 varieties of water pumps with non-interchangeable
spares [Duncan, Mosley], or Bangladeshis with even
more varieties of project procedure, but not to gang up
on the recipient with agreed macroconditions for aid
[Daniel, Van Arkadie] that may reflect no more than
current dogma - Fabian yesterday, neo-classical
today, tomorrow what: ecological, monetarist,
feminist, moral-majoritarian?
Still, coordination is a Good Thing. Unfortunately it
falls foul of a more complex, deeper reason why donor
and receipt errors in aid management reinforce each
other. That reason is as follows. Each donor wants to
use aid, quite legitimately, to further self-interest -
commercial, political, even military - as well as
development. Each donor knows that such attempts
largely cancel each other out, leaving no donor better
off, incompetent donor companies baled out, aid less
effective, and recipients resentful. Yet each donor
fears that, if it ceased to use 'training' to push its own
doctrines or products, or allowed recipients to treat its
aid projects normally rather than as privileged islands
with rules of their own, or (in the case of bilateral
donors) untied its aid, then it would lose out to less
scrupulous donors. A coordinating agreement would
be useless, since who would enforce it, or police the
cheats? (Hence the sad death of moves towards
multilateral untying.) Exactly similarly, each recipient
ministry knows that its efforts to raise its share in
foreign aid, and to evade the aid rules, are largely
cancelled out by the efforts of other ministries, leaving
aid less effective and wasting time; yet each ministry
fears that abstention from lobbying will not be
matched - nor agreements to abstain respected - by
its 'colleagues'. So both donors and recipient
ministries, each group imprisoned in its dilemma, put
up with aid much less effective than it might be. If this
analysis is right, it casts doubt on coordination,
conditionality, and even policy dialogue as paths to
greater aid-effectiveness - and underlines the need
for donors to concentrate aid upon countries relatively
immune from the perverse competition described
above.
Consider aid tying. Each donor pushes its own
technology, usually inappropriate - in Kenya, too
capital-intensive for drinking-water supply [Duncan],
too diverse and inconsistent for water pumps
[Mosley]. Yet, if just one donor unties, it loses. Until
donors come to believe in one another's virtue - or in
a (hitherto unenforceable) agreement to untie - how
is coordination feasible?
Or consider the drive to disburse - the sudden
replication of success at Comilla, Bangladesh, into
near disaster with IRDPs (Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Programme) in 410 Manas (rural block;
population typically about 0.2 mn); the rush to spread
training-and-visit extension, or warabandi irrigation,
in India [Toye]; the extreme, last-minute rush to get
the money out at the end of each financial year [Ryrie].
Each donor, each ministry, fears to be upstaged by the
others. Again, trust or enforcement - neither very
likely - seems a necessary precondition for
coordination.
Perhaps most seriously, take the propensity of each
donor to seek special favours for its projects. Often,
donors demand for their projects the status of area-
specific islands, free from normal ministerial pro-
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cedures, each with its donor-specific system, yet each
stretching to rupture the recipient's limited capacities
for cross-ministry coordination, and fragmenting and
impoverishing the national administrative system
[Van Arkadie; Toye, on community development; or
'rent-a-district' in Sri Lanka]. Sometimes such
approaches succeed, as with Kenya's Semi-arid Lands
Programmes [Duncan]; or with some Sri Lankan
district IRDPs. And some countries, like Malawi,
minimise the problems by concentrating on few
donors and projects [Hewitt and Kydd]. Yet even the
complex, distinctive procedures of planning the aid
cycle created by each donor [Ryrie] - while
legitimate, if not inevitable - create major problems
for recipients, worsening the returns to al/donors' aid.
Yet which donor will disarm - will simplify,
homogenise or coordinate its aid procedures, and
align project requirements to normal recipient
practices - unless it can trust other donors similarly
to abandon a search for special project advantages,
even if that search ultimately damages all projects?
Recipient ministries behave like donors, imprisoned in
the same dilemma. Bangladesh has its 'coordinating
agency', yet major ministries continue to lobby for
bigger shares of the (more or less fixed) aid total [Van
Arkadie].
These problems, while not solved, would be less
damaging to aid-effectiveness if each recipient had to
deal with fewer competing donors. This is illustrated
by the much greater success of Malawi than of
Bangladesh in coordinating and concentrating aid and
avoiding undue diversions of internal resources to its
management [Hewitt and Kydd, Van Arkadie]. Rapid
personnel turnover, interacting with a large number of
donors, makes it even harder for recipient ministries to
achieve coherence [Van Arkadie]. Each donor too,
might better serve its interests by concentration
[Ryrie] - but may fear that other donors would 'take
advantage' to seize commercial and political gains in
the territory from which rival donors had retreated. So
even attempts to simplify the aid problems generated
by 'prisoners' dilemma' fall victim to it. There may
nevertheless be enough recognition of the costs of
fragmented aid to create a 'head of steam' behind
coordination. But the barriers to major advance are
fundamental.
V
In 1978-84, several factors combined to bring about a
shift from project aid to balance-of-payments support
- to programme aid, structural adjustment loans, aid
for maintenance and rehabilitation. First, drought,
debt and slump - and even the past policies of
donors, eg in Kenya [Duncan], expansionism after the
1976-77 coffee boom; and in Malawi [Hewitt and
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Kydd], IRDPs with surprisingly costly recurrent
import costs - meant that many recipients could not
afford imports to run and maintain existing roads,
dams and factories; it made little sense for donors to
help build more, and much sense to increase current
import levels. Second, some recipients' policies were
increasingly felt by donors to reduce the effectiveness
of project aid (Section III). Third, donors' competing
projects and 'disbursement imperatives' were felt by
recipients to bring increasing costs, relative to
programme aid.
Donors owe their taxpayers some evidence of aid-
effectiveness. At project level, such evidence is
available, and donors think they know what
conditions to seek for projects they back; recipients
accept that. But aid to a programme of investment is
tested by the success of that programme. Hence, partly
to convince taxpayers that programme aid is effective
(and also partly to make projects work better), donors
increasingly try to impose or negotiate programme
conditions.
The Indian aid experience of the l960s [Daniel,
referring to Lipton, Toye and Cassen, 1984] provides
clear warnings of what fails, and guidelines to what
might work, in respect of programme conditions.
Attempts to impose grand macroeconomic strategies,
unbacked by deep analysis or mutual learning, and
followed by failure to deliver the aid even when the
(ill-timed) conditions were met, are well known in
India, but were discredited by the 1965-67 devaluation
saga. The aid relationship took several years to
recover, but since the mid-1970s genuine policy
dialogue - mutual learning - has brought major
policy changes (albeit controversial, and probably
spread too fast beyond the pilot stage) in agricultural
extension, irrigation design, and other areas [Toye,
Daniel]. Before this experience, a long process of
institutional learning in the largest economic sector,
agriculture, had taken place; the 'lessons' of
extension (community development), price policy,
and technical but field-tested biological research and
diffusion were learned sequentially, each partial
success revealing the inadequacies in other policy
regions [Toye].
Yet macro-conditionality in Africa largely ignores the
Indian lessons. The tone has been set, not by donors
such as the World Bank with its steady learning and
rejection of uniform prescriptions, but by the Fund,
compelled by its Articles [Daniel] - and by the lack of
an alternative theory of adjustment? - to impose the
'three Ds' of deficit management: deflation, decontrol,
devaluation. Reforms, often badly needed, are
insisted upon in abrasive ways that, as in Tanzania,
actually delay reform [Daniel, Van Arkadie]; with
little information about timing, or about how supply
will respond to the incentive; and, as the World Bank
increasingly notes, with distressingly little power to
persuade donors to expand aid if recipients do meet
macro-conditions. Even aid coordination, desirable to
harmonise donor procedures and equipment and to
save recipient time, can dangerously shade into
agreement to impose a macro-condition reflecting
current dogma or fashion [Van Arkadie]. Moreover,
macro-conditions tend to work only when they 'push
at an open door' - when as in Malawi [Hewitt and
Kydd] they can help, encourage and accelerate actions
the government wished to take anyway. 'Macro-
conditions are fungible, as well as project aid'
[Mosley]. Where a government 'complies against [its]
will, 'tis of the same opinion still' [Butler 1694];
external conditions imposed on Kenya were similar to
the internal advice of the Ndegwa Committee, but the
government, unwilling to reform grain marketing,
found ways to get round that condition [Duncan]. The
World Bank's Operations Evaluation Division,
reporting on the fate of macro-conditions upon its
Structural Adjustment Loan to Turkey, stressed the
key role of(a) prior political accord, and (b) a realistic,
not-too-rapid schedule for implementing the
conditions.
The Indian precedent strongly suggests that successful
policy dialogue in Africa, too, must shift, from instant
macro-conditions based on textbook blueprints,
towards low-pressure and sector-specific measures
agreed after a longish process of mutual learning, and
based on the development of appropriate technical
packages and institutions, as well as price incentives
[Daniel]. Institutional transfer does best to start from
local social realities, not from false analogies to the
universalism of natural science [Toye]; direct
institutional copying by donors, eg from West
German border-town development to growth poles in
Malawi [Hewitt and Kydd] or from US country agents
to Indian extension workers [Toye], is seldom, though
not never, cost-effective.
Useful sector dialogue in Africa will require major
expansion of manpower aid [Ryrie], not least to
increase recipient capacity for policy analysis
[Daniel]. Currently, it is often a dialogue of the dumb,
especially on agriculture, where very few donor or
recipient officials - at least in difficult cases like Zaire
- have enough prolonged experience of local farming
systems and responses. Manpower aid has a good
record in Asia, from the very same donor agencies that
so seldom perform well in Africa [Muscat]. Part of the
reason for this is the complete absence of any good,
tested, or conceptually rich theory of the optimal rate
at which various parts of a very underdeveloped
manpower system should become self-reliant [Muscat];
certainly most donors, and recipients, have assumed
wildly unrealistic rates of feasible 'Africanisation' in
many sectors [Ryrie], while proliferating complex and
capital-intensive projects - and policies - that
needed yet more experts.
VI
While all this will help, there is a limit to which
manpower aid, institution-building, or consequent
mutual sector-specific learning - any more than the
dubious paths of macro-conditionality - can
'persuade a leopard to change its spots' [Mosley]. As
with aid for poverty alleviation [Chaudhuri] and for
primary health care [White, de Kadt and Andersson
1979], so with aid-effectiveness overall: perhaps each
donor should, rather, concentrate funds on fewer than
(say) the UK's 125 recipients [Ryrie] - and on
recipients which, subject to donor national interests,
meet its own standards of aid-effectiveness. If that led
each recipient to an aid pattern concentrated on fewer
donors, that would, as in Malawi, ease the problems of
project proliferation and aid management [Hewitt and
Kydd], thereby raising aid-effectiveness further.
Whether on project performance [World Bank 1985]
or on cross-section indicators [Mosley 1986], aid to
Asia is much more effective than aid to Africa. Yet
poor African countries get much more aid-per-person
than poor Asian countries, and the disparity is
widening [OECD 1984]. This is bound to damage
aid-effectiveness, though the continental division is
much too crude - there are some Asian failures, and
several African successes eg Malawi, Cameroons,
Rwanda, Botswana, and until recently Kenya and the
Ivory Coast.
There are some respects in which aid allocation among
countries is little short of a scandal. Miniscule and
wealthy French islands electing députés to the French
Parliament, Soviet puppet states and janissary states,
US military client states in West Asia and Latin
America - these absorb very large proportions of
scarce aid, which is thus denied to the efficient poor. In
1982, 34.1 per cent of allocable aid went to countries
containing 2.7 per cent of the population of the
developing world - mostly in middle-income
countries; they enjoyed $102 of net aid disbursements
per person in that year. The remaining 3.3 bn people of
the Third World each received $5.60. In the
circumstances it is astonishing that the 'aid
community', donor and recipient, attains the modest
but - until recently, and outside Africa still -
satisfactory level of aid-effectiveness revealed in these
papers.
See OECD [1984]. This refers to total net aid disbursements, from
multilateral agencies and bilaterally from OECD, OPEC, and
CMEA countries. Each of the three groups makes a major
contribution to the concentration of aid on a few, mostly small,
countries. 1f China is excluded - but why? - the above disparity
becomes only slightly less outrageous.
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